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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty Kindle Edition

by Daron Acemoglu (Author), James A. Robinson (Author) Format: Kindle Edition

9,559 ratings

in Comparative Politics

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NEW YORK TIMES AND WALL STREET JOURNAL BESTSELLER • From two winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, “who have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for a country’s prosperity”

“A wildly ambitious work that hopscotches through history and around the world to answer the very big question of why some countries get rich and others don’t.”—The New York Times

FINALIST: Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award • ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR: The Washington Post, Financial Times, The Economist, BusinessWeek, Bloomberg, The Christian Science Monitor, The Plain Dealer

Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, or geography that determines prosperity or poverty? As Why Nations Fail shows, none of these factors is either definitive or destiny.

Drawing on fifteen years of original research, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is our man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or the lack of it). Korea, to take just one example, is a remarkably homogenous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created those two different institutional trajectories. Acemoglu and Robinson marshal extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, among them:

• Will China’s economy continue to grow at such a high speed and ultimately overwhelm the West?

• Are America’s best days behind it? Are we creating a vicious cycle that enriches and empowers a small minority?

“This book will change the way people think about the wealth and poverty of nations . . . as ambitious as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.”—BusinessWeek

From the Publisher

From two winners of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

WARNING: California’s Proposition 65

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Guest Reviewer: Charles C. Mann on Why Nations Fail
Charles C. Mann, a correspondent for The Atlantic, Science, and Wired, has written for Fortune, The New York Times, Smithsonian, Technology Review, Vanity Fair, and The Washington Post, as well as for the TV network HBO and the series Law & Order. A three-time National Magazine Award finalist, he is the recipient of writing awards from the American Bar Association, the American Institute of Physics, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Lannan Foundation. His 1491 won the National Academies Communication Award for the best book of the year. He lives in Amherst, Massachusetts.

A few years ago, while I was researching a book on the history of globalization, I suddenly realized that I was seeing the same two names on a lot of the smartest stuff I was reading. The names belonged to two economists, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. Much of their work focused on a single question: Why are poor places poor, and is there something we can do about it?

This is one of the most important questions imaginable in economics—indeed, in the world today. It is also one of the most politically fraught. In working on my book, I read numerous attempts by economists, historians and other researchers to explain why most of North America and Europe is wealthy and why most of Asia, Africa and Latin America is not. But these usually boiled down to claims that rich nations had won the game by cheating poor places or that poor places had inherently inferior cultures (or locations) which prevented them from rising. Conservative economists used the discussion as a chance to extol the wide-open markets they already believed in; liberal economists used it to make the attacks on unrestrained capitalism they were already making. And all too often both seemed wildly ignorant of history. I can’t recall encountering another subject on which so many people expended so much energy to generate so little light.

Acemoglu and Robinson were in another category entirely. They assembled what is, in effect, a gigantic, super-complete database of every country’s history, and used it to ask questions—wicked smart questions. They found unexpected answers—ones that may not satisfy partisans of either side, but have the ring of truth.

Why Nations Fail is full of astounding stories. I ended up carrying the book around, asking friends, “Did you know this?” The stories make it a pleasure to read. More important, though, Acemoglu and Robinson changed my perspective on how the world works. My suspicion is that I won’t be the only person to say this after reading Why Nations Fail.

Review

"Should be required reading for politicians and anyone concerned with economic development."—Jared Diamond, New York Review of Books

"...bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece."—The Washington Post

“This is an intellectually rich book that develops an important thesis with verve. It should be widely read.”—Financial Times

“Why Nations Fail is a splendid piece of scholarship and a showcase of economic rigor.”—The Wall Street Journal

“The main strength of this book is beyond the power of summary: it is packed, from beginning to end, with historical vignettes that are both erudite and fascinating.”—The Observer (UK)

"A brilliant book.”—Bloomberg

“Why Nations Fail is a wildly ambitious work that hopscotches through history and around the world to answer the very big question of why some countries get rich and others don’t.”—The New York Times

"A wonderfully readable mix of history, political science, and economics, this book will change the way we think about economic development."—Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics

"Without the inclusive institutions that first evolved in the West, sustainable growth is impossible, because only a truly free society can foster genuine innovation and the creative destruction that is its corollary."—Niall Ferguson, author of The Ascent of Money

"Two centuries from now our great-great-great grandchildren will be, similarly, reading Why Nations Fail."—George Akerlof, Nobel laureate in economics, 2001

“It’s the politics, stupid! That is Acemoglu and Robinson’s simple yet compelling explanation for why so many countries fail to develop. But they also document how sensible economic ideas and policies often achieve little in the absence of fundamental political change.”—Dani Rodrik, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

“A brilliant and uplifting book—yet also a deeply disturbing wake-up call.”—Simon Johnson, co-author of 13 Bankers and professor at MIT Sloan

“This highly accessible book provides welcome insight to specialists and general readers alike.”—Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man and The Origins of Political Order

“This intimate connection between political and economic institutions is the heart of [the authors'] major contribution, and has resulted in a study of great vitality on one of the crucial questions in economics and political economy.”—Gary S. Becker, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 1992

“This not only a fascinating and interesting book: it is a really important one . . . to understanding the successes and failures of societies and nations.”—Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2001

About the Author

Daron Acemoglu is the Killian Professor of Economics at MIT. In 2005 he received the John Bates Clark Medal awarded to economists under forty judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge. He is also the co-author of The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty.

James A. Robinson, a political scientist and an economist, is the David Florence Professor of Government at Harvard University. A world-renowned expert on Latin America and Africa, he has worked in Botswana, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. He is also the co-author of The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Preface

This book is about the huge differences in incomes and standards of living that separate the rich countries of the world, such as the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, from the poor, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and South Asia.

As we write this preface, North Africa and the Middle East have been shaken by the “Arab Spring” started by the so-called Jasmine Revolution, which was initially ignited by public outrage over the selfimmolation of a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010. By January 14, 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia since 1987, had stepped down, but far from abating, the revolutionary fervor against the rule of privileged elites in Tunisia was getting stronger and had already spread to the rest of the Middle East. Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt with a tight grip for almost thirty years, was ousted on February 11, 2011. The fates of the regimes in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are unknown as we complete this preface.

The roots of discontent in these countries lie in their poverty. The average Egyptian has an income level of around 12 percent of the average citizen of the United States and can expect to live ten fewer years; 20 percent of the population is in dire poverty. Though these differences are significant, they are actually quite small compared with those between the United States and the poorest countries in the world, such as North Korea, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, where well over half the population lives in poverty.

Why is Egypt so much poorer than the United States? What are the constraints that keep Egyptians from becoming more prosperous? Is the poverty of Egypt immutable, or can it be eradicated? A natural way to start thinking about this is to look at what the Egyptians themselves are saying about the problems they face and why they rose up against the Mubarak regime. Noha Hamed, twenty-four, a worker at an advertising agency in Cairo, made her views clear as she demonstrated in Tahrir Square: “We are suffering from corruption, oppression and bad education. We are living amid a corrupt system which has to change.” Another in the square, Mosaab El Shami, twenty, a pharmacy student, concurred: “I hope that by the end of this year we will have an elected government and that universal freedoms are applied and that we put an end to the corruption that has taken over this country.” The protestors in Tahrir Square spoke with one voice about the corruption of the government, its inability to deliver public services, and the lack of equality of opportunity in their country. They particularly complained about repression and the absence of political rights. As Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, wrote on Twitter on January 13, 2011, “Tunisia: repression + absence of social justice + denial of channels for peaceful change = a ticking bomb.” Egyptians and Tunisians both saw their economic problems as being fundamentally caused by their lack of political rights. When the protestors started to formulate their demands more systematically, the fi rst twelve immediate demands posted by Wael Khalil, the software engineer and blogger who emerged as one of the leaders of the Egyptian protest movement, were all focused on political change. Issues such as raising the minimum wage appeared only among the transitional demands that were to be implemented later.

To Egyptians, the things that have held them back include an ineffective and corrupt state and a society where they cannot use their talent, ambition, ingenuity, and what education they can get. But they also recognize that the roots of these problems are political. All the economic impediments they face stem from the way political power in Egypt is exercised and monopolized by a narrow elite. This, they understand, is the fi rst thing that has to change.

Yet, in believing this, the protestors of Tahrir Square have sharply diverged from the conventional wisdom on this topic. When they reason about why a country such as Egypt is poor, most academics and commentators emphasize completely different factors. Some stress that Egypt’s poverty is determined primarily by its geography, by the fact that the country is mostly a desert and lacks adequate rainfall, and that its soils and climate do not allow productive agriculture. Others instead point to cultural attributes of Egyptians that are supposedly inimical to economic development and prosperity. Egyptians, they argue, lack the same sort of work ethic and cultural traits that have allowed others to prosper, and instead have accepted Islamic beliefs that are inconsistent with economic success. A third approach, the one dominant among economists and policy pundits, is based on the notion that the rulers of Egypt simply don’t know what is needed to make their country prosperous, and have followed incorrect policies and strategies in the past. If these rulers would only get the right advice from the right advisers, the thinking goes, prosperity would follow. To these academics and pundits, the fact that Egypt has been ruled by narrow elites feathering their nests at the expense of society seems irrelevant to understanding the country’s economic problems.

In this book we’ll argue that the Egyptians in Tahrir Square, not most academics and commentators, have the right idea. In fact, Egypt is poor precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that have organized society for their own benefi t at the expense of the vast mass of people. Political power has been narrowly concentrated, and has been used to create great wealth for those who possess it, such as the $70 billion fortune apparently accumulated by ex-president Mubarak. The losers have been the Egyptian people, as they only too well understand.

We’ll show that this interpretation of Egyptian poverty, the people’s interpretation, turns out to provide a general explanation for why poor countries are poor. Whether it is North Korea, Sierra Leone, or Zimbabwe, we’ll show that poor countries are poor for the same reason that Egypt is poor. Countries such as Great Britain and the United States became rich because their citizens overthrew the elites who controlled power and created a society where political rights were much more broadly distributed, where the government was accountable and responsive to citizens, and where the great mass of people could take advantage of economic opportunities. We’ll show that to understand why there is such inequality in the world today we have to delve into the past and study the historical dynamics of societies. We’ll see that the reason that Britain is richer than Egypt is because in 1688, Britain (or England, to be exact) had a revolution that transformed the politics and thus the economics of the nation. People fought for and won more political rights, and they used them to expand their economic opportunities. The result was a fundamentally different political and economic trajectory, culminating in the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution and the technologies it unleashed didn’t spread to Egypt, as that country was under the control of the Ottoman Empire, which treated Egypt in rather the same way as the Mubarak family later did. Ottoman rule in Egypt was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798, but the country then fell under the control of British colonialism, which had as little interest as the Ottomans in promoting Egypt’s prosperity. Though the Egyptians shook off the Ottoman and British empires and, in 1952, overthrew their monarchy, these were not revolutions like that of 1688 in England, and rather than fundamentally transforming politics in Egypt, they brought to power another elite as disinterested in achieving prosperity for ordinary Egyptians as the Ottoman and British had been. In consequence, the basic structure of society did not change, and Egypt stayed poor.

In this book we’ll study how these patterns reproduce themselves over time and why sometimes they are altered, as they were in England in 1688 and in France with the revolution of 1789. This will help us to understand if the situation in Egypt has changed today and whether the revolution that overthrew Mubarak will lead to a new set of institutions capable of bringing prosperity to ordinary Egyptians. Egypt has had revolutions in the past that did not change things, because those who mounted the revolutions simply took over the reins from those they’d deposed and recreated a similar system. It is indeed difficult for ordinary citizens to acquire real political power and change the way their society works. But it is possible, and we’ll see how this happened in England, France, and the United States, and also in Japan, Botswana, and Brazil. Fundamentally it is a political transformation of this sort that is required for a poor society to become rich. There is evidence that this may be happening in Egypt. Reda Metwaly, another protestor in Tahrir Square, argued, “Now you see Muslims and Christians together, now you see old and young together, all wanting the same thing.” We’ll see that such a broad movement in society was a key part of what happened in these other political transformations. If we understand when and why such transitions occur, we will be in a better position to evaluate when we expect such movements to fail as they have often done in the past and when we may hope that they will succeed and improve the lives of millions.

Product details

ASIN ‏ : ‎ B0058Z4NR8
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Crown Currency; 1st edition (March 20, 2012)
Publication date ‏ : ‎ March 20, 2012
Language ‏ : ‎ English
File size ‏ : ‎ 18.5 MB
Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Print length ‏ : ‎ 556 pages

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Daron Acemoglu
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Daron Acemoglu is the Killian Professor of Economics at MIT. In 2005 he received the John Bates Clark Medal awarded to economists under forty judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge. (Photo by Peter Tenzer.)
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James A. Robinson
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James A. Robinson, a political scientist and an economist, is one of 8 current University Professors at University of Chicago. Focused on Latin America and Africa, he is currently conducting research in Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Haiti and in Colombia where he has taught for many years during the summer at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.
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Customers find the book well-written and highly informative about historical periods, with one noting it provides fascinating histories relating to wealth and poverty. Moreover, they appreciate the political perspective, particularly how inclusive political and economic institutions create prosperity, and consider it an economic must-read that's reasonably priced. However, the book receives mixed feedback - while customers praise the authors' work, they find it repetitive, and some criticize the historical accounts for being oversimplified.

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508 customers mention "Readability"456 positive52 negative

Customers find the book highly readable and well-written, appreciating its detailed content and clear thesis, with one customer noting it's accessible for non-economists.

"...In closing, “Why Nations Fail” was much better and far more intellectually deep than I had anticipated...." Read more

"Overall: very very interesting and very important topic. I would give it 5 stars except it is very long, detailed, and not an easy read...." Read more

"...This is described in some detail in Chapter 7 and showed how Britain and subsequently the US industrialized and slowly established more and more..." Read more

"...And if you produce your theory in an easy-to-read book that makes your point over and over again, you have a winner - maybe even your own Nobel..." Read more

470 customers mention "Insight"427 positive43 negative

Customers find the book insightful, appreciating its interesting thoughts and thesis, as well as its incredibly informative content about various historical periods.

"...A second leitmotif is that the economic and political institutions complement each other and that economically inclusive but politically extractive..." Read more

"...Sachs, Easterly, Collier and Sen and an important contribution to strategic studies and cultural history, easily on par with Diamond’s “Guns, Germs,..." Read more

"...The book yeilds a lot of insight on the ways that countries can evolve, and indeed patterns that are sure to cause failure...." Read more

"...So, it's easy enough to read, it contains important truths, and has earned the respect of the best minds on the subject. Get it today." Read more

86 customers mention "Political perspective"62 positive24 negative

Customers appreciate the book's political perspective, particularly its analysis of how inclusive institutions and pluralistic political systems contribute to prosperity.

"...This 2013 bestseller argues that only open and inclusive political institutions – those most likely to provide the freedoms Sen claims are critical..." Read more

"...Inclusive political and economic institutions create prosperity, while extractive ones concentrate wealth and power, keeping nations in cycles of..." Read more

"...How institutions change through political conflict and how the past shapes the present. The Black Death, the contingent path of history...." Read more

"...5- The main idea of this book is that instituitions are decisive, to the destiny of nations. And this idea is mainly correct...." Read more

29 customers mention "Value for money"25 positive4 negative

Customers find the book reasonably priced and worth every minute of their time, describing it as a must-read and one of the best books on economics.

"...of the book, let me make clear that this is one of the best books on economics I have read in a long time...." Read more

"...However well worth it. Thesis in brief: some countries are prosperous, and others are not. What causes the difference?..." Read more

"...can include, climate, geography, governance, ease of transport, economics (hyperinflation, for example), soil and water conditions, local diseases,..." Read more

"...It is not an easy read, but in the end definitely worth it." Read more

18 customers mention "Author quality"14 positive4 negative

Customers appreciate the authors' work, with one noting their brilliant economic expertise and another highlighting their thorough background information.

"...The authors gave copious and detailed examples around the world to support this theory...." Read more

"A brilliant piece of work by two brilliant minds!" Read more

"...The authors do a good job of showing how so many nations wind up being run by a small elite group and or dictator and how the nations resources are..." Read more

"...interesting about the book is the there is little or no discussion on the impact of religion on the development of the state which is probably just..." Read more

91 customers mention "Repetition"15 positive76 negative

Customers find the book repetitive and boring.

"...The book tends to be repetitive, hammering home it’s various points but, on the other hand, it certainly provides many examples to enhance the..." Read more

"...The main thesis is restated every few pages. That is too much repetition." Read more

"...2. As mentioned by many commenters, the authors repeat themselves. A lot...." Read more

"...There is far too much redundancy and verbosity and I often found myself frustrated that whole paragraphs could be eliminated every few pages without..." Read more

22 customers mention "Historical accuracy"4 positive18 negative

Customers criticize the historical accuracy of the book, noting that it oversimplifies the analysis of institutions and history, and contains significant errors.

"...this book: it is simplistic and perhaps overly ambitious, the history is bad, it explains away competing explanations. They are all true...." Read more

"...Some serious omissions. The book feels scrubbed clean of politically incorrect/ miss-matching data...." Read more

"...I must simply accept critical arguments that some of the history is a bit inaccurate, that some of the examples are oversimplifications and that..." Read more

"...So it’s not for the faint of historical heart. The ideas presented are quite profound however and are immensely insightful...." Read more

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Sergei Soares
An Emancipation Proclamation for Economists Interested in Equality
Reviewed in the United States on May 11, 2012
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To an economist like me, reading Why Nations Fail, by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, is akin to being set free from shackles worn since I began studying. However, first let me say that the book has many and serious shortcomings. Let me talk about these before I get into why this book set me free. Since I am going to strongly criticize aspects of the book, let me make clear that this is one of the best books on economics I have read in a long time.

Several criticisms have been leveled in other reviews against this book: it is simplistic and perhaps overly ambitious, the history is bad, it explains away competing explanations. They are all true.

The book is undoubtedly simplistic. Basically, the authors state that the institutions of a nation or society can be placed on a one dimensional continuum running from "extractive" to "inclusive" and this explains the history of humanity from the neolithic to the present day. A second leitmotif is that the economic and political institutions complement each other and that economically inclusive but politically extractive institutions cannot last for long (as well as the opposite). Finally, since political and economic institutions reinforce each other, they are quite difficult to change, leading to what the authors call "the iron law of oligarchy." Needless to say, this really oversimplifies the analysis of institutions and history. While Acemoglu and Robinson give many, many historical examples to illustrate their thesis, some are more convincing than others. They use a huge mallet to hammer all the facts into their mold, either ignoring or re-interpreting contrary evidence.

I am no historian, but I do know the history of the region in which I live, Latin America, reasonably well. When Latin American examples were used in the book, they were shallow and even wrong. For example, the authors talk quite a bit about the establishment of indigenous "serfdom", with terrible extractive institutions such as the encomienda and repartimiento, in much of Hispanic America. I agree the story they tell is quite important but they do not get it quite right. Acemoglu and Robinson tell the tale of these institutions as if they were simply set in place by colonizing Spaniards when the truth was much more complex, involving conflicts and constant negotiation between the Spanish colonizers, the Spanish Crown, and the conquered peoples themselves. The colonizers wanted to set up slavery instead of serfdom but were impeded from doing so by the Crown through the Leyes Nuevas. The story is told marvelously well in La Patria del Criollo by Severo Martinez Pelaez. The funny thing is that the correct narrative would fit well into the inclusive-extractive framework with a richness that comes from putting in two groups of elite actors with divergent interests, but Acemoglu and Robinson tell it so simplistically so as to miss out.

Likewise, the authors analyze, in different points of the book, Colombia and Brazil, with exceptional praise for Brazilian institutions while they heap abuse upon the Colombian ones. Brazil at the present time has, evidently, better institutions than a Colombia only (we hope) beginning to emerge from decades of civil war. But these two countries are much more alike than different. If you believe the tale told by Acemoglu and Robinson, they could have been comparing Japan and Burma, and not two nations with similar history, GDP, and institutions. While Colombia has seen many horrors and has a long road to travel, recent progress in reigning in lawlessness and chaos is undeniable. While Brazil has seen amazing institutional progress in the last fez decades, many of its cities suffer with murder rates higher than those of Colombian cities, de facto slave labor can be still found in some areas, and its income and especially property distributions are still among the most unequal in Latin America. Especially jarring is that, in other parts of the book, the authors place great emphasis on when institutions limit executive power, giving as an example the American system's unwillingness to allow FDR to pack the Supreme Court to get his way. The same happened in Colombia when Alvaro Uribe passed legislation allowing him to run for a third term and the Supreme Court shot it down with the broad support of Colombian society, including Uribe's allies.

The same can be said of their analysis of Mexico and Argentina: maybe not wrong, but terribly shallow. I know little of the Glorious Revolution, the Roman Empire, the Meiji Restoration, the history of Botswana, or much else of what the book is based upon. But if the standard is the same as the their Latin American examples, then much of the book based upon is poor history. In defense of the authors, it is difficult to draw the details with finesse when painting with a broad brush and the history of humanity from the neolithic to present day is about as broad as you can get in the social sciences.

A final criticism is that Acemoglu and Robinson do not give competing explanations for the backwardness of nations the credit they deserve. They explain away rather than seek dialogue. They classify competing explanations into the Geography Hypothesis, the Culture Hypothesis, and the Ignorance Hypothesis. One problem is that they ignore other competing explanations that go from scientific knowledge (see Margaret Jacob's Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West) to various Marxist explanations based upon capital accumulation. While Acemoglu and Robinson obviously admire Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel - which is very well-argued "geography is destiny" book - they ignore other important proponents of the Geography Hypothesis such as Kenneth Pommeranz. I feel their case would be made stronger if they argued that the two approaches were complementary and not adversarial. A relation between geography, technology, political institutions, and economic institutions would be a much stronger theory than institutions alone.

With regards to the Culture Hypothesis, they are (I believe) correct in criticizing it for being so fluid as to be virtually without content. But here my take is not entirely neutral as I particularly loathe the Culture Hypothesis.

But it is on the Ignorance Hypothesis that Acemoglu and Robinson fire their cannon with relish. Being intelligent economists in contact with the intellectual world of "development" I am sure they are very frustrated at the arrogance of policy advisors from the likes of the World Bank, United Nations, or IMF who believe they have the solution to all the developing world's problems "if only policymakers would listen to them." I am not unsympathetic to their disgust at these people but I think Acemoglu and Robinson throw the baby away with the dirty bath water. History is just too full of examples of disastrous policies (disastrous for those who implemented them, not only for the poor souls who inhabit their countries) for the Ignorance Hypothesis to be dismissed out of hand. The authors blame almost all, if not all, bad policies on the material interests of the elite whose position would be endangered by good policy.

A more subtle, and, in my opinion, much more serious, problem is that knowledge and interests are not independent. It is one thing for the elite to choose bad (bad for the many) policy if that policy can be dressed up in plausible and attractive intellectual robes and quite another if that policy is seen as nothing more than plundering of the many by the few (see Antonio Gramsci on role of the intellectual in allowing policy agendas to go forward or not). The "economic nationalism" that has destroyed so many African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern economies is not just pure extraction of wealth of the many by the few; it also dressed in a coherent economic theory espoused by a host of intelligent sociologists and economists (for a popular, if somewhat limited exposition, see The Open Veins of Latin America by Eduardo Galeano). This is why dismissal of the Ignorance Hypothesis is so dangerous: not only is knowledge power, but economic theories that are on your side are also power.

So the book has quite a few shortcomings. Why did I like it so much?

Because as economists we are taught from course one that you cannot have your cake and eat it too. The trade-off between efficiency and equity has been fed to us since before we were weaned. The result to an economist very interested in equality such as myself are intellectual shackles that hobble and cripple our thinking.

Acemoglu and Robinson show us that in the real world, not some paretian maximum efficiency world, but the real one full of monopolies and other horrendous extractive institutions, there is no such trade-off. Equity is efficiency. Only egalitarian institutions allow for the full creative potential of people to be unleashed and thus only egalitarian institutions allow for boundless, unlimited growth based upon technology and productivity. There may be an equity-efficiency trade-off in Sweden or Norway, but certainly not in Mexico, Brazil, Haiti, Zimbabwe, or Pakistan. Much of this has been around in different guises since Schumpeter (who the authors cite extensively) and, more recently, in the endogenous growth literature, but nowhere has it been as clearly stated as in Why Nations Fail.

Why Nations Fail not only states this as its official position but, in spite of all its shortcomings, argues the point so well so as to be entirely convincing (at least to me). The fact that the authors get much of the history not quite right and that they fight rather than incorporate "competing" explanations does not reduce importance of the book and its central message. The sheer optimism of its viewpoint is as liberating as the Emancipation Proclamation.

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T. Graczewski
Politics isn't everything, it's the only thing
Reviewed in the United States on June 18, 2014
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In his 2000 bestseller “Development as Freedom” Pulitzer Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen made the uplifting argument that the cornerstone of international development ought to be the promotion and growth of human freedom. What his thesis notably lacked was evidence. It seems to me that evidence supporting Sen’s important hypothesis is precisely what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson present here in “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty.” This 2013 bestseller argues that only open and inclusive political institutions – those most likely to provide the freedoms Sen claims are critical – can achieve sustainable economic growth (e.g. “The central thesis of this book is that economic growth and prosperity are associated with inclusive economic and political institutions, while extractive institutions typically lead to stagnation and poverty”).

To begin with, Acemoglu and Robinson shred three of the most commonly held theses on global economic inequality, while setting the stage to argue that politics and political institutions along with their associated incentives are what really matters for long term, sustainable economic growth. First, they dismiss the Geography theory, usually associated with Jared Diamond (but also Jeffrey Sachs), which suggests that north/south continents and tropical climates are poorly suited for economic growth. That’s simply not true, the authors say. North America was once far less economically desirable than South America; the Middle East was the cradle of civilization, yet non-oil Middle East countries today are as poor as Peru and Bolivia, which are far poorer than the UK or US. “History thus leaves little doubt that there is no simple connection between a tropical location and economic success.” Second, they reject Culture theory, which started with Max Weber and the Protestant work ethic, and is just as invalid as Geography according to the authors. How can one explain the differences between North and South Korea or the US versus Mexican sides of Nogales, Arizona? Or why is it that the US, Canada, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – all former English colonies and places that have shared cultures and/ or colonial heritage – have vastly different economies today? Finally, they critique Ignorance theory, which is favored by most modern development economists, especially Jeffrey Sachs, the doyen of the poverty-can-be-eradicated school, and essentially maintains that countries are poor because they make wrongheaded policy decisions. If only they had better advisors and made smarter choices to foster economic growth, Ignorance theory proponents argue, everything would work out just fine. Acemoglu and Robinson, on the other hand, claim that leaders rarely make stupid decisions. They make rational choices that may be economically disastrous for their country, but usually align well with economic incentives that are part of the institutions that they’ve created or, more often, inherited. There is no ignorance; it’s just that the system has been set up to encourage harmful policies. In other words, “They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose.”

So what then is required for sustainable economic growth? The authors claim that “…to understand world inequality we have to understand why some societies are organized in very inefficient and socially undesirable ways.” They argue that “the ability of economic institutions to harness the potential of inclusive markets, encourage technological innovation, invest in people, and mobilize the talents and skills of a large number of individuals is critical for economic growth…” and that “…explaining why so many economic institutions fail to meet these simple objectives is the central theme of this book.”

They lay out a simple and compelling hypothesis to support their position, although it does have some holes. The argument goes like this. First, a country needs to have a foundation of stable political centralization in order to provide basic law and order. This quickly excludes such international basket cases as Afghanistan and Somalia. Thus, from their perspective, without a firm political foundation there is no hope for meaningful growth. Next, the political institutions must be pluralistic, thereby ensuring that the required stability will come from the rule of law and the establishment of a level economic and political playing field for all, and not merely by the use of force flexed by some powerful entrenched elite. Nations that possess these political traits (centralized, pluralistic, rule of law) tend to have inclusive economic institutions, such as free labor markets, secure property rights and free market economies. The combination of these political and economic institutions fosters creative destructive, to use Joseph Schumpeter’s famous phrase, as long established elites cannot thwart the new technologies and processes that threaten the status quo and thus their privileged political and economic position. This focus on the centrality of creative destruction or what is now more commonly referred to as “disruption” from Clay Christensen’s seminal “The Innovator’s Dilemma,” is really the linchpin of the authors’ entire case. I found that it has special merit, although it is far from air tight.

The authors view the Korean Peninsula as a powerful example of their theory at work. The two halves of the peninsula share the same geography and culture, so clearly those two explanations do not apply. But what about Ignorance? Although the South was until recently authoritarian like the North, the regime in Seoul allowed for secure private property, unbiased rule of law, proper public services, and an open labor market. Authoritarian regimes of every political stripe tend to have extractive economic institutions, the authors say. The state – and thus the economy, as the two are fundamentally intertwined – is set up for the exclusive benefit of some small elite. More inclusive economic institutions, with the potential for more rapid and broader based economic growth, are often eschewed because such growth would almost certainly come at the expense of the elites.

That isn’t to say that extractive regimes cannot produce economic growth. They certainly can, so say the authors, but they are destined to sputter out and collapse eventually according to their theory. Acemoglu and Robinson muster a truly sweeping array of historical examples to make their case, from the Natufian society in the Levant around 9500 BC and the Mayan empire in Central America from 400-800 AD to the Bushong in the Congo in the 1600s and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. They also boldly predict collapse for the current Communist China economic juggernaut in the years to come (“China…is likely to run out of steam”). Indeed, extractive institutions come in all different shapes and sizes today, according to the authors. Some are Communist, others Socialist, a few are ostensibly free market democracies. But the inevitable common denominator is that the wealth of the nation is expropriated by a narrow and closed elite, whether that be the anti-communist Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the anti-FARC paramilitary in Colombia, the traditional Spanish elite in Argentina, the Sung family in North Korea, crony capitalists in Egypt, or the cotton kings of Uzbekistan.

These impressively diverse societies – as measured geographically, culturally, temporally – share many similar traits according to the authors: political centralization, often by force; forced re-allocation of productive resources and mainly for the enrichment of a narrow elite; general economic growth but technological and business process stagnation; and an inherently unstable political system as the incentives to displace the current elites and acquire the narrow stream of great wealth is overpowering. Thus, politically centralized (often absolutist) regimes with extractive economic institutions can deliver economic growth – often spectacular growth – but only for a limited period of time and almost never through technological innovation. The inherent conflicts in the system lead to a “vicious cycle” as “extractive political institutions [support] extractive economic institutions, which in turn [provide] the basis for extractive political institutions and the continuation of the power of the same elite.” The end result is always the same: economic and political collapse. However, the authors say nothing about how long such extractive regimes can continue to grow nor what sends them into collapse. In fact, many of the doomed extractive regimes survived and prospered for quite a long time: Rome (nearly a millennium), the Maya (half a millennium), and many European empires (centuries at least). Will China get its extractive institution comeuppance next year, next decade, next century or next millennium? The authors don’t hazard a guess.

A major theme of “Why Nations Fail” is the incredible long range importance of innovation: “The fear of creative destruction is the main reason why there was no sustained increase in living standards between the Neolithic and Industrial revolutions,” the authors boldly claim. They go on to note how William Lee developed a knitting machine for making stockings in England in the 1580s. Queen Elizabeth quickly squelched the idea, fearing the potential disruptions to employment as a threat to political stability. The authors write that this is precisely what all extractive political regimes with non-inclusive political institutions are wont to do: block disruptive technology. It would be the Glorious Revolution of 1688 – an event the authors claim was nothing less than “…the most important political revolution of the past two millennia” – that would change everything. Indeed, they write that “World inequality today exists because during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some nations were able to take advantage of the Industrial Revolution and the technologies and the methods of organization that it brought while others were unable to do so.”

So what made the English Glorious Revolution so important? Well, to start, it promoted political centralization and pluralism, two key ingredients in their recipe for sustained economic growth. Indeed, politics is at the foundation of their case (“…while economics institutions are critical for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has”). As for the Glorious Revolution, it was a “…momentous event precisely because it was led by an emboldened broad coalition and further empowered this coalition, which managed to forge a constitutional regime with constraints on the power of both the executive and, equally crucially, any one of its members.” It gave England a Parliament that heard and responded to public petitions from a broad spectrum of society, which in turn laid the foundation for the Industrial Revolution. From this radical new system many popular initiatives were developed. Their combination had a profound impact, according to thesis of “Why Nations Fail”: new and improved property rights (i.e. no longer would Englishmen fear arbitrary confiscation by the Crown); improved infrastructure in the form of canals, turnpikes, and later railroads (because investors felt more secure in their investments); a fiscal regime that taxed land rather than hearths, thus shifting the tax burden to land owners rather than manufacturers (which further increased industrial investment); greater access to capital in the form of the Bank of England (a direct outcome of the Glorious Revolution allowing for ready capital to anyone with proper collateral); and aggressive protection of trade and manufacturing from outside competition, but accompanied by the dissolution of internal monopolies. In short, the authors claim that “The Glorious Revolution…was about a fundamental reorganization of economics institutions in favor of innovators and entrepreneurs, based on the emergence of more secure and efficient property rights.” Acemoglu and Robinson note just how dramatic were the waves of innovations that propelled the Industrial Revolution (e.g. the time to produce 100 lbs. of cotton fell from 50,000 hours by hand to 300 hours with a waterframe to 135 hours with a Spinning Jenny) and that these cumulative innovations were almost all developed by new men from humble backgrounds, the antithesis of the traditional ossified, hereditary elite.

Moreover, inclusive institutions tend to promote a “virtuous cycle” of “… constraints against the exercise and usurpation of power…[and also] tend to create inclusive economic institutions, which in turn make the continuation of inclusive political institutions more likely.” The exact opposite of “…extractive economic institutions [that] create the platform for extractive political institutions to persist…” The authors use Australia, the French Revolution, and China versus Japan to further their core thesis that inclusive political institutions were fundamental for taking full advantage of the Industrial Revolution, which they claim explains the global economic inequality we have today. States with an entrenched, absolutist political system and extractive economic institutions (Eastern Europe, Ottoman Empire, Africa, China) were dominated by elites that were inherently opposed to change. “The aristocracies would be economic losers from industrialization. More important, they would also be political losers, as the process of industrialization would undoubtedly create instability and political challenges to their monopoly of political power.”

“Rich nations [US, UK, Canada, Australia] are rich largely because they managed to develop inclusive institutions at some point during the past three hundred years. These institutions have persisted through a process of virtuous circles. Even if inclusive only in a limited sense to begin with, and sometimes fragile, they generated dynamics that would create a process of positive feedback, gradually increasing their inclusiveness.”

Acemoglu and Robinson conclude “Why Nations Fail” with some promising words about an unlikely economic hero: Brazil. “The rise of Brazil since the 1970s was not engineered by economists of international institutions instructing Brazilian policymakers on how to design better policies or avoid market failures. It was not achieved with injections of foreign aid. It was not the natural outcome of modernization. Rather, it was the consequence of diverse groups of people courageously building inclusive institutions.”

In closing, “Why Nations Fail” was much better and far more intellectually deep than I had anticipated. It has been one of the most thought-provoking reads I’ve had in a long time. It is an admirable blend of contemporary economic development theory to be read alongside Sachs, Easterly, Collier and Sen and an important contribution to strategic studies and cultural history, easily on par with Diamond’s “Guns, Germs, and Steel” and McNeil’s “Plagues and Peoples” or “The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000.” Overall, this is a book well worth reading.

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Johnny Stecchino
Un viaggio eccezionale.
Reviewed in Italy on August 10, 2018
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Avevo sentito parlare in maniera estasiata di Acemoglu da due amici studenti di economia, ma non avevo mai avuto modo di "viverlo" in prima persona.
"Why Nations Fail" non è solo un saggio economico, ma un vero e proprio viaggio che, al suo termine, ti fa sentire accresciuto intellettualmente e nella visione del mondo. Acemoglu è stato in grado di far coinciliare in maniera eccellente varie materie: dall'economia alla geografia; dalla storia alla sociologia.
Libro che reputo dovrebbe essere fatto leggere in uno degli ultimi due anni di superiori, e che consiglio tantissimo ai miei colleghi di giurisprudenza appassionati di diritto comparato; diritto internazionale ed economia politica.
A tratti forse leggermente ripetitivo, ma comunque un "must".

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jediklon
Great book!
Reviewed in Spain on March 30, 2025
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Excelent! It goes to show why nations, due to the nature of their institution, evolve to benefit or not the majority of their citizens.

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Cliente de Amazon
Excelente lectura.
Reviewed in Mexico on July 9, 2023
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Excelente libro. Investigación muy detallada. Lectura 100% recomendable para entender el contexto actual en lo político y económico en el mundo.

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Aamir majeed
Good
Reviewed in Saudi Arabia on November 16, 2022
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Good

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BruceC3
Wow, what an interesting read
Reviewed in Australia on July 18, 2024
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I found the amount of information presented overwhelming at times. Could only read an hour at a time trying to absorb the content.
Loved the concepts presented and the myriad of historical examples to back up the thesis of the book.
I would have found clear subheadings in each chapter helpful to remain on track.

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5.0 out of 5 stars An Emancipation Proclamation for Economists Interested in Equality

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5.0 out of 5 stars Un viaggio eccezionale.

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An Emancipation Proclamation for Economists Interested in Equality

Politics isn't everything, it's the only thing

Un viaggio eccezionale.

Great book!

Excelente lectura.

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Wow, what an interesting read